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Criminal Law - Double Punishment -
Intent and Objective Test
Defendant was accused of unlawfully entering a hospital under
construction and stealing therefrom an air compressor. Defendant
was convicted and punished for burglary (unlawful entry) and
grand theft (unlawful taking), with the sentences to run con-
secutively.1 Held: Section 654, California's double punishment stat-
ute,' prohibits Defendant from being punished for more than one of
the offenses because burglary and grand theft constitute parts of a
continuous course of criminal conduct motivated by one intent
and objective. People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449
(1962).
The rule against double punishment, in general terms, prohibits
the imposition of a separate penalty for each of several offenses com-
mitted in one criminal transaction. The rule was nonexistent prior
to the mid-1800s.' It arose as a result of the numerous instances of
'The terms "consecutive sentences" and "concurrent sentences" are antithetical. A
California court has given the following definition of consecutive sentences: "[A] sentence
which runs consecutively is one which 'shall commence at the termination of the first term
of imprisonment to which he has been sentenced, or at the termination of the second or
subsequent term of imprisonment to which be has been sentenced, as the case may be.'"
People v. Hirshbein, 16 Cal. App. 2d 458, 60 P.2d 532, 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936). Another
court has said of concurrent sentences: "[T]he word 'concurrently' is generally used when
terms of imprisonment are imposed separately for each of two or more offenses charged in
the same indictment, and to indicate that while the convicted prisoner is serving one he is
serving all." Martinez v. Nagle, 53 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1931).
"See text accompanying note 10 infra.
' Before this date, there was no need for the rule against double punishment. Punishment
was strictly relative in the early days of criminal law, and the penalty meted out would be
determined not only by the seriousness of the crime, but also by such factors as the accused's
station in life, his reputation, and the number of times he had been in trouble. The judge
or jury would take all of these factors into consideration and then determine one aggregate
punishment. Punishment often took the forms of physical torture and confiscation of prop-
erty rather than the incarceration of today; consequently, there was no problem whether the
terms should be concurrent or consecutive. Such refinements arose only after codification of
the penal laws. See Clark & Marshall, Crimes §§ 1.00-.10 (6th ed. 1958).
Unlike the rule against double punishment, double jeopardy has been known and in use
since the earliest days of reported criminal law. First as an ancient common-law defense
and later as a constitutional protection, the plea of double jeopardy has been invoked regularly
to keep a defendant from being harassed by more than one prosecution for the same criminal
offense. The double jeopardy doctrine gives meaning to trial by jury. If a person could be
put on trial repeatedly for the same offense, the constitutional right to a jury trial would
be emasculated. The jury's function would be voided. A United States Supreme Court case,
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873), has held that the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution applies to double punishment as well as to double prosecutions. This was
the basis for use of the double jeopardy plea in a one-trial, multicount indictment situation.
For a California Supreme Court case which held that no plea of double jeopardy can be
made when defendant is tried but once, see People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 370 P.2d
275
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partial overlap of offenses, a feature inherent in every penal code."
It is commonplace for a defendant to violate more than one criminal
statute as he perpetrates his criminal actions. The issue of the amount
of punishment invariably becomes relevant if the accused is found
guilty of violating more than one statute.'
The great majority of states solved the problem of double punish-
ment through the courts on an ad hoc basis.' The result was a
strong conflict of authority between some of these jurisdictions as to
certain combinations of offenses.! A few states enacted statutes cover-
ing specific combinations of offenses' and expressly defining the
amount of punishment to be given when these combinations existed
in one criminal transaction. Generally, these statutes were very
narrow in scope and did not greatly alleviate the overall problem.
Four states, including California, sensed the scope of the double
1007 (1962). Such diversities are indicative of the confusion in this area. For further treat-
ments of the problem of double jeopardy, see Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30
Tul. L. Rev. 409 (1956); Note, 7 Buffalo L. Rev. 461 (1958).
" Although penal codes brought important advantages to the criminal law, e.g., clarity
and consolidation, many complications also arose. One complication was the overlap of
offenses. However, there was no choice but to have such overlaps in the penal codes. The
drafters were interested primarily in phrasing the statutes so that every conceivable instance
of criminal behavior would be covered. The zealousness with which this was done may have
increased the overlap problem, but it has never been suggested that an effective penal code
could be written in any other way. Since this problem would continue to exist as long as the
penal codes themselves existed, the rule against double punishment was created to counteract
the unjust situations which would arise.
5 It is not difficult to discover the advantages which inured to the prosecutor when the
multicount indictment gained acceptance. Such an indictment could be drawn to include every
possible offense committed, with each of the offenses the subject of an individual count of
the indictment. With such individual enumeration, it is unusual, and in fact it is the
rule, that an accused will be found guilty on more than one count. This creates the problem
of double punishment.
' The courts acquired this responsibility by default in states in which the legislature failed
to enact any applicable statutes. A court in these states seldom went as far as to say that
with a certain decision it was attempting to solve the problem of double punishment. How-
ever, by determining whether an accused who had committed a combination of offenses, e.g.,
burglary and robbery, kidnapping and rape, or forgery and larceny, would be punished for
each of the offenses or for only one, the courts were setting the state's policy in that respect.
Illustrations of such devolution of the law are found in: Colorado: Ex parte Hill, 101 Colo.
243, 72 P.2d 471 (1937); Maryland: Vandergrift v. State, 226 Md. 38, 171 A.2d 713(1961); New Jersey: State v. Byra, 128 N.J.L. 429, 26 A.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd,
129 N.J.L. 384, 30 A.2d 49 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943); North Carolina: State v. Cody, 224
N.C. 470, 31 S.E.2d 445 (1944); Virginia: Robinson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 134, 56
S.E.2d 367 (1949).T Compare Branch v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 394, 35 S.E.2d 593 (1945), with Com-
monwealth v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 21 A.2d 920 (1941). See also State v. Bobbitt, 228 Mo.
252, 128 S.W. 953 (1910); State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595,-93 N.W.2d 354 (1958).
'Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1399 (1953) states: "If a house be entered in such a manner
as to be burglary, and the one guilty of such burglary shall after entry commit any other
offense, he shall be punished for burglary and also for whatever other offense is so committed."
Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1324 (1953) states: "If any bodily injury less than death is
suffered by any one by reason of the commission of any offense named in this and the pre-
ceding chapter [arson and related offenses], the punishment may be increased so as not to
exceed double that which is prescribed in cases where no such injury is suffered."
See also N.Y. Pen. Law § 406; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.19.040 (1961).
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punishment problem and enacted similar statutes" that purported
to cover all criminal combinations. California's double punishment
statute, section 654, was based on Field's Draft of the New York
Penal Code and was part of the original 1872 penal code. It has
remained unaltered as follows:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by differ-
ent provisions of this code may be punished under either of such pro-
visions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one ... "
However, this statute does not prohibit double punishment in all
cases. The effectiveness of these statutes, i.e., the extent to which
double punishment would be precluded, depended on the definition
given to the word "act." Obviously, the more liberal and inclusive
the definition was, the more thorough the preclusion of double
punishment would be. Having no guidelines to follow in defining
"tact,' 'U the California courts were forced to grapple with the word
on a case-by-case basis. Predictably, the result was a confusing set
of dubious and parochial criteria, each adopted for a particular set
of facts but none applicable to all situations. An early view restricted
the statute's apolication to cases involving included offenses." Later
cases inouired into the reason for the use of physical force by the
accused in pervetratinz his crimes."2 If the physical actions connected
9 Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-1641 (1956); California: Cal. Pen. Code § 654;
New York: N.Y. Pen. Law § 1938; Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-23 (1953).
0 Cal. Pen. Code § 654. There are two other subiects covered in this statute. They are
double jeopardy and substituted punishments. This Note will be concerned only with the
part of the statute which concerns double punishment.
There are at least two well recognized exceptions to the application of the double punish-
ment portion of the California statute. Section 654 does not apoly to instances in which a
single statute names different acts and different offenses and punishes each act separately.
People v. Coltrin. 5 Cal. 2d 649, 55 P.2d 1161 (1936); People v. Mehra, 73 Cal. App. 162,
238 Pac. 802 (1925). Also, this section is not applicable to instances in which one act has
two results, each of which is an act of violence against the person of separate individuals.
People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924).
ss The courts have not had available the important interpretative aid, legislative intent.
Since § 654 and numerous other penal statutes were enacted into law as parts of the first
California penal code, there were few, if any, comments by the enacting session of the
legislature on the individual statutes. Further, § 654 has not been amended since its enact-
ment; subsequent legislative sessions have not voiced opinions as to its merits and appli-
cability.
52 People v. Trantham, 24 Cal. App. 2d 177, 74 P.2d 851 (1937); People v. Mazzola,
99 Cal. App. 682, 279 Pac. 211 (1929).
"
2 Compare People v. Logan, 41 Cal. 2d 279, 260 P.2d 20 (1953), with Ex parte
Chapman. 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954). In Logan the defendants hit the victim
with a baseball bat to incapacitate him while they robbed him. In Chapman the
defendants had completed an armed robbery, and as their victim attempted to escape, the
defendants hit him with a revolver. The court held in Logan that since incapacitating the
victim was an integral part of the defendants' scheme, double punishment could not be
allowed. However, in Chapman the robbery had been completed, so assaulting their victim
was not a part of the robbery, and, therefore, double punishment was allowed.
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with one of the crimes were deemed "an inseparable part of" 4 or
"merely incidental to"'" the other crime's perpetration, they were
considered only one act, and the defendant was punished only once.
In other cases the court looked to the "singleness of the act."1  As
is evident, the various interpretations were seldom similar and in
some instances resulted in express reversals of earlier cases."'
The intent and objective test was first referred to in Neal v. State."
In this case the defendants caused a fire in the victims' bedroom and
were convicted of arson and attempted murder. On appeal the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in allowing only one punishment, stated:
Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 6S4 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor."
From the facts it is clear that the defendants' only act was the
throwing of a fire bomb through the victims' bedroom window. Since
14 People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950). The court said:
Defendant's convictions for violation of Penal Code section 209 (kidnapping)
and Penal Code section 211 (robbery) both rest upon the commission of a
single act: the taking of personal property in the possession of Waisler and
Lesher from their persons and in their immediate possession by force and
fear, namely, by seizing and confining them under force of arms. The seizure
and confinement were an inseparable part of the robbery. Id. at 7. (Emphasis
added.)
15 People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal. 2d 649, 55 P.2d 1161 (1936). The court reasoned: "If the
act involved in one charge is necessarily involved in the other and is merely incidental to
that charge, but one offense is committed, and it cannot be carved into two offenses in
order to inflict a double punishment." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1166.
"People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950). The court stated: "If a
course of criminal conduct causes the commission of more than one offense, each of which
can be committed without committing any other, the applicability of 654 will depend
upon . . .whether a single act has been so committed that more than one statute has been
violated. . . . It is the singleness of the act and not of the offense that is determinative."
(Emphasis added.) id. at 8.
"
7 Compare People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d 5 (1958), with People v. Coltrin,
5 Cal. 2d 649, 55 P.2d 1161 (1936). These are both abortion-death cases with very similar
facts. In the earlier Coltrin case, the court reasoned that performing an abortion which
results in death is something more than a single act, and at some point an act of the
defendant caused the death of the victim, but was not connected with the abortion.
Therefore, that court allowed the defendant to be punished for both offenses, abortion and
murder. Later, in Brown the court reconsidered its reasoning in Coltrin and said: "It is
manifest from the evidence that defendant committed against Lucy only one criminal act,
that is, the insertion of a blunt instrument in combination with the injection of a
solution. . . . It is artificial to say that the act which caused death in the Coltrin case,
and the act which caused death in the present case, was another act than that which
constituted the abortion." People v. Brown, 320 P.2d 13, 15. Therefore, in Brown the
court allowed defendant to be punished for only one of his two offenses.
Other courts have adhered to a simple, if not completely satisfactory, test to determine
a double punishment statute's applicability. This test is an analysis of each case to determine
whether an individual act can be established as the basis for each offense charged. A case
in which this test has been applied is People v. Battle, 32 Misc. 2d 196, 228 N.Y.S.2d 455
(Albany County Ct. 1961).
,855 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839 (1960).
'a Id. at 843.
NOTES
it has never been questioned that only one punishment may be given
when two or more offenses are committed by a single act of the
defendant," there was no doubt that the defendants in this case
could be punished for only one of the crimes." Hence, resort by the
court in Neal to the intent and objective test was not needed to reach
the correct result of single punishment. The court's espousal of this
test, therefore, cannot be said to be binding precedent and perhaps
can be characterized as nothing more than judicial dictum.'
The situation was different in People v. McFarland." The defendant
clearly committed more than one physical act by breaking into the
hospital and carrying away the air compressor."' With these facts
before it, the court examined the Neal statement concerning the
intent and objective test and adopted it as the test to determine in
what situations the double punishment statute will be applied. The
court stated:
[T]he prohibition of the statute against double punishment applies not
only where "one 'act' in the ordinary sense" is involved but also where
there is a 'course of conduct' which violates more than one statute and
comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one
statute within the meaning of section 654. . . .The divisibility of a
course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the de-
fendant; and ... if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the
defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than
one.2s
From this it is clear that the California test is that multiple offenses
must be examined in the light of the defendant's intent and objec-
tive to see whether he can be punished more than once. Furthermore,
The only exception to this statement occurs if this single act has an injurious
effect on more than one person. See note 10 supra.Since the bomb had injured two persons, defendants could be given consecutive
sentences for two attempted murder convictions, but no punishment could be given for
the arson conviction, or if conviction on one count of arson carried a heavier penalty than
conviction on two counts of attempted murder, then defendants could be punished for the
arson conviction, but not for the attempted murder convictions.
"'Childers v. Childers, 74 Cal. App. 2d 56, 168 P.2d 218 (1946). The court stated:
"Whatever may be said in an opinion that is not necessary to a determination of the
question involved is to be regarded as mere dictum." Id. at 221.
Compare Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938), in which
under the facts of the case construction of constitutional sections was unnecessary; language
of the opinion construing such sections was said to be mere "dictum."
2 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449 (1962).
4 The dissent offers this fact as its main argument in claiming that § 654 is inapplicable.
After stating that there is clearly more than one act present in this case, the dissent says:
"Section 654 unmistakably speaks in the singular of 'An act or omission which is made
punishable in different ways by different provisions' of the Penal Code. It does not speak
in the plural of acts or omissions which independently constitute different crimes and which
as such are made punishable in different ways by different provisions of the code." 376
P.2d at 466.
2' 376 P.2d at 4;6.
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even though the test had a doubtful beginning, the court in McFar-
land raised it to full legal stature by incorporating it as the main (and
perhaps sole) basis for the decision.
California is the only state to adopt the intent and objective test.
Of the other three states with double punishment statutes, only New
York has delved very deeply into its statute."6 New York's test is a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether an individual act can be
established as the basis for each offense charged. Adherence to this
approach is illustrated by the court of appeals in People v. Jackson,"
in which the court stated:
We recognize that section 193 82s is not by its terms limited to included
crimes .... [I] f, however, the acts are separate, it will not apply. Here
one single act is not the basis of the two charges; [the assault in the
first degree and the attempted robbery] were separate and distinct and
involved two different kinds of conduct, even though arising out of the
same transaction."9
On the face of the words used, New York has not by its approach
reached the problem which the California court solved in the prin-
cipal case, i.e., the interpretation of the word act. New York has
chosen to interpret the entire statute and in so doing has used the
word act to help define its interpretation."0 This difference could be
ignored as a matter of placing emphasis; however, since this word is
so clearly the key to both statutes, it would seem that through non-
definition of the word act, New York's courts have left themselves
vulnerable to attack."
ee The logical explanation for this is that of these three states, only New York has
had more than a handfull of cases in point arise. Utah has said emphatically that its
statute will apply only in cases in which there is one act. However, in the only case to
date in which this statute has been involved, the Utah court said only that the statute
in question "refers to one act or omission. Obviously a burglary in and of itself is one
act, requiring no theft, and a larceny is another or second act requiring a theft." State v.
Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262, 263 n.3 (1962).
In the few occasions in which Arizona has construed its double punishment statute, it
has held uniformly that the statute will not operate unless the two alleged crimes have
identical components. Therefore, since burglary and grand theft do not have identical
components, separate punishments could be given for that combination in Arizona. State
v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187 (1960); State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 285
P.2d 161 (1954); State v. Sullivan, 68 Ariz. 81, 200 P.2d 346 (1948).
272 N.Y.2d 259, 140 N.E.2d 282 (1957).
2sN.Y. Pen. Law § 1938. This statute is New York's counterpart to California's
double punishment statute. Except for two or three unimportant words, the statutes are
identical.
ao 140 N.E.2d at 286.
"0These cases have helped define the terms "separate and distinct" and "single in-
separable act." People v. Repola, 305 N.Y. 740, 113 N.E.2d 42 (1953); People v. Plesh,
283 App. Div. 868, 130 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1954); People v. Zipkin, 202 Misc. 552, 118
N.Y.S.2d 697 (Monroe County Ct. 1952).
s Although New York has not met the main problem squarely since it has chosen not
to define the word "act," the decisions of the New York cases have a consistency which is
not present among California decisions. For examples of California's inconsistency, see text
accompanying notes 12-19 supra. For examples of New York's consistency, see note 28 supra.
The approaches of New York and California can also be dis-
tinguished by the manner in which the facts are adjudged by the
jury. In New York an objective basis will be used in elevating the
evidence;"2 that is, the jury will decide whether a defendant's actions
can be compartmentalized into two or more acts and whether there
was more than one kind of conduct. California's intent and ob-
jective test, on the other hand, requires a subjective inquiry.
On the surface the objective approach might appear to be more
trustworthy; however, resort to subjective intent is replete through-
out the criminal law' and has proven to be adequate. 4
In People v. McFarland the dissent' advanced a multi-pronged
attack on the intent and objective test. Basically, the arguments were:
(1) another statute forbids such an interpretation; (2) the problem
of double punishment should be solved by using a case-by-case,
factual analysis; (3) the application of the intent and objective test
will have a diversionary effect on the jury in carrying out its func-
tions; and (4) the appellate courts are becoming a second trier of
fact through the application of this test. As to the dissent's first argu-
ment, there is no clear expression of legislative intent to prevent the
court from adopting its interpretation of the double punishment
statute. In fact, this very important touchstone, which is so heavily
relied upon in the similar area of the federal law, 6 is almost un-
"2 That the New York courts will use an objective basis is divulged implicitly by such
statements as: "Here, one single act is not the basis of the two charges; they were separable
and distinct and involved two different kinds of conduct, even though arising out of the
same transaction." People v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1957).
83 This is not to imply that subjective intent has no place in civil actions. In fact, most
suits of a testamentary or contractual nature will be determined through this method.
" The crime of murder furnishes an appropriate example. In every jurisdiction, a
malicious, subjective intent must be proved to be possessed, either expressly or imputedly,
by an accused before he can be convicted of the highest degree of murder. No other
method has been discovered which will deal as well with this serious crime.
82 Justice Schauer, who wrote the dissenting opinion in the present case, had written
dissenting opinions on two previous occasions in which he voiced his disapproval of the
intent and objective test. Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 369 P.2d 697, 700
(1962); Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 845 (1960). In the present case
two other justices concurred in the dissent.
86 The question of double punishment has been in issue in several recent federal cases.
See Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.
415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); United States v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952). In each case, the United States Supreme Court
relied heavily on the intent of Congress in enacting the particular statute in question. These
decisions, in fact, turned on the discernment of this Congressional intent.
The majority decision in the instant case succeeds effectively in obfuscating the posture
of the federal law on double punishment. It refers to the four Supreme Court decisions cited
above and blandly states that each "emphasized the intent of the defendant." 376 P.2d at
456. A reading of these cases will show that although the Supreme Court refused to allow
double punishment in each case, the decisions were not grounded on the intent of the
defendant but on the intent of Congress.
Each of the federal cases cited by the majority involves plural violations of one federal
statute while the instant case is concerned with a singular violation of more than one statute.
1964] NOTES
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available. However, the dissent urged 7 that section 4598 aids in
interpreting section 654. Section 459 makes burglary a completed
offense upon the entering of any house or structure with intent to
commit a felony. The dissent argued that this section indicates that
the legislature intended separate punishment for burglary and what-
ever other felony, if any, was committed." However, it is just as
logical to assume that the legislature was only concerned with making
unlawful breaking and entering a criminal offense so that persons
apprehended before completing their intended objectives would not
be outside the law's reaches.
The dissent cannot be criticized for desiring a factual analysis of
each case to determine whether the defendant shall be doubly
punished. However, the intent and objective test is compatible with
such an analysis. The majority has not rejected the use of a case-by-
case analysis; rather, it has postulated a method whereby it can be
accomplished. If the dissent is anxious about the true flexibility of the
test, it must be admitted that such flexibility can be determined only
by observing how readily susceptible of application the test is to the
cases which arise. Subsequent to the instant case, five cases in which
the intent and objective test was applied have been reviewed by
California district courts of appeals."0 Although the sample provided
by these cases is inadequate upon which to base a generalization, it
would appear that no injustice has resulted from section 654's ap-
plication via the intent and objective test. In each case the court has
been able to determine logically whether the two or more offenses
were committed with one intent and objective. The inflexibility argu-
ment is valid only if the facts of each case will not fit into the mold
provided by the test. Thus far this requirement is being met.
By its very words, § 654 would not be applicable to the situations in these federal cases,
and they offer no substantiation whatsoever for the majority's decision. See Clark v. United
States, 267 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1959), for a case which has made the distinction between
plural violations of one statute and a single violation of two or more statutes.
37 376 P.2d at 462 (dissenting opinion).
" Cal. Pen. Code § 459 states:
Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, ware-
house, store, mill barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, railroad
car, trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by said
code when the doors of such vehicle are locked, aircraft as defined by the Har-
bors and Navigation Code, mine or any underground portion thereof, with
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.
39 376 P.2d at 462-63.4
°People v. Magee, - Cal. App. 2d __, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(robbery and murder); People v. Rosenburg, - Cal. App. 2d -, 28 Cal. Rptr. 214
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (grand theft and forgery); People v. Keller, 212 Cal. App. 2d 216,
27 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (conspiracy to commit burglary and attempted
burglary); People v. Morrison, 212 Cal. App. 2d 33, 27 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (robbery and kidnapping for purpose of robbery); People v. Jones, 211 Cal. App. 2d
63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 429 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (burglary and robbery).
[Vol. 18
NOTES
The dissent also claims that the trial court is guided away from a
factual analysis of the evidence and instead becomes "enmeshed in a
post hoc speculation as to the scope of the criminal's objective."4"
Clearly, the jury will have an added responsibility; however, this in
itself is not a reason to decry the test. It cannot be said that the
adding of one duty to a jury's many duties will create an insolu-
ble situation. The trier of fact has coped successfully with discerning
subjective intent in many areas of the criminal law; it can be done
here.
The dissent's fourth attack pertains to the appellate court and its
function. The dissent said, "the applicability of the so-called 'intent
and objective test' is apparently a game that any number can play."4
This statement was based on the fact that seventy-five per cent of
the cases on double punishment which were heard between the times
of the Neal and McFarland cases resulted in reversals of one or more
convictions." Thus, the dissent contended that the appellate courts
obviously interpretated the Neal dictum "as a license to indulge at
the appellate level in unbridled speculation as to the scope and con-
tent of the criminal's 'objective.' "" Such a situation would make the
lower appellate court a second trier of fact, and the principle of
appellate review, whereby the appellate court regards the evidence
in the light most favorable to the finding of the original trier of
fact,4" would be emasculated if not discarded. Obviously, no newly
conceived test, no matter what its import, should pre-empt or disrupt
the time-tested balance of functions between the courts. While it is
agreed that such imbalance could not be tolerated, this does not
necessarily mean that the intent and objective test must be abandoned.
The blame should be placed where it is deserved. This imbalance is not
a fault of the test. Instead, it is a weakness of California's appellate
system, and if nothing else, the California Supreme Court should re-
apprise the lower appellate courts of their continuing role in main-
taining this important balance. Therefore, none of the defects alleged
as justification for the abridgement of the intent and objective test
are as validly defacing as the dissenters claim.
41 376 P.2d at 467.
42Ibid.
431d. at 468 n.3.
4Id. at 468.
4' An appellate court is not a forum in which to make a new case. It is merely
a court of review to determine whether or not the rulings and judgment of the
court below upon the case as made there were correct. Any other rule, it has
been well said, would overturn all just conceptions of appellate procedures in
cases at law and would result in making an appeal in such action a trial
de novo, without the presence of witnesses, or the means of correcting errors
and omissions. Warren v. Warren, 93 Va. 73, 24 S.E. 913 (1896).
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